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Résumé / Abstract
À partir d’un échantillon tiré du National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY), nous estimons
un modèle de programmation dynamique des choix d’éducation en présence d’hétérogénéité non observée
dans les capacités scolaires et aptitudes sur le marché de l’emploi. L’utilité instantanée de la fréquentation
scolaire ainsi que la fonction de salaire sont évaluées de façon flexible. L’hypothèse nulle que les
rendements marginaux de l’éducation sont constants est catégoriquement rejetée en faveur d’une fonction
de salaire convexe composée de huit segments de fonction d'approximation spline. Les rendements
marginaux s’avèrent être très faibles jusqu’à la onzième année (1 % ou moins par an), augmentent jusqu’à
3,7 % pour la douzième année et dépassent les 10 % pour les années 14 à 16. Le rendement moyen
augmente uniformément de 0,4 % (7ème année) à 4,6 % (16ème année). La convexité de la fonction de
régression logarithmique du salaire implique que ceux qui atteignent un plus haut niveau de scolarisation
obtiennent également de meilleurs rendements moyens sur le marché de l’emploi. Nous rejetons
l’hypothèse nulle selon laquelle les aptitudes non observées sur le marché du travail ne sont pas corrélées
avec les niveaux d’éducation atteints. Ce résultat va à l’encontre de ceux obtenus dans plusieurs études
antérieures qui estimaient le rendement de l’éducation par la méthode des MCO. Nous trouvons une
corrélation positive entre le niveau de scolarité atteint et les aptitudes sur le marché de l’emploi,
confirmant ainsi l’existence d’un «Biais d’aptitude» positif.
We estimate a structural dynamic programming model of schooling decisions with unobserved
heterogeneity in school ability and market ability on a sample taken from the National Longitudinal
Survey of Youth (NLSY). Both the instantaneous utility of attending school and the wage regression
function are estimated flexibly. The null hypothesis that the local returns to schooling are constant is
strongly rejected in favor of a convex wage regression function composed of 8 spline segments. The local
returns are very low until grade 11 (1% per year or less), increase to 3.7% in grade 12 and exceed 10%
only from grade 14 to grade 16. The average return increases smoothly from 0.4% (grade 7) to 4.6%
(grade 16). The convexity of the log wage regression function implies that those who obtain more
schooling also experience higher average returns. We strongly reject the null hypothesis that unobserved
market ability is uncorrelated with realized schooling attainments, which underlies many previous studies
that have used OLS to estimate the return to schooling. The correlation between realized schooling and
market ability is found to be positive and is consistent with the existence of a positive “Ability Bias”.
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1 Introduction
In the empirical literature, it is customary to estimate the return to schooling
by ordinary least squares (OLS) or Instrumental Variable (IV) techniques.1 The
choice of OLS is justi¯ed only if realized schooling and unobserved labor market
ability are uncorrelated. If not, OLS estimates su®er the \Ability Bias" and other
estimation methods, such as IV, may be used. The volume of work devoted to
the return to schooling is a good indication of the importance of this topic as
perceived by economists.2 Frequently, instrumental variables (IV) techniques are
applied in a context where the instrument is only weakly correlated with schooling
attainments (Staiger and Stock, 1997). As a consequence, the validity of very
high returns to schooling, reported in a simple regression framework, should be
seriously questioned (see Manski and Pepper, 2000).3
When IV techniques are chosen, the log wage regression is usually assumed to
be linear in schooling. However, there is no obvious reason to presume that the
local returns to schooling are independent of grade level. Indeed, heterogeneity
in any component of schooling choices (subjective discount rates, ability or spe-
ci¯c taste for schooling) will lead to improper inference if the local returns are
erroneously assumed to be constant. As individuals with lower taste for school-
ing tend to stop school earlier, OLS (or IV) estimates of the return to schooling,
which impose equality between local and average returns at all levels of school-
ing, will be strongly a®ected by the relative frequencies of individuals with high
and low taste for schooling. More precisely, if there are large di®erences in local
returns between various grade levels, the OLS estimate (measuring an average
log wage increment per year of schooling) will tend to be biased toward the local
returns at schooling attainments that are the most common in the sample data.
In the literature, this is referred to as the \Discount Rate Bias"4 Estimating the
1To use the same terminology as in the reduced-form literature, the return (local) to school-
ing refers to the percentage wage increase per additional year of schooling. In the paper, the
terms local and marginal returns may be used interchangeably. The average return refers to the
slope of the straight line between the intercept and the expected log wage at a given number
of years of schooling.
2A World Wide Web survey of the most recent literature indicates that, since 1970, more
than 200 published articles or working papers (set in a reduced-form) have been devoted to the
estimation of the return to schooling or surrounding issues. Very often, studies based on IV
methods conclude that the returns to schooling can be between 20% and 40% above the OLS
estimates. Reported estimates around 15% per year (for the US) are not uncommon although
standard errors are typically very high. See Card (2000) for a survey.
3Manski and Pepper (2000) obtain upper bound estimates of the return to schooling from
a sample taken from the NLSY. Their results cast doubts on the high returns reported in the
literature.
4The term \Discount Rate Bias" is due to Lang (1993). Card (2000) conjectured that
OLS (or IV) estimates will over-estimate the true return to schooling because the local return
to schooling decreases with grade level and because there is a positive correlation between
individual discount rates and the average return to schooling (ie: \the disadvantaged will
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true returns to schooling is therefore not a simple task. As unobserved taste for
schooling cannot be identi¯ed in reduced-form models, investigating the relation-
ships between school ability, market ability and the return to schooling requires
researchers to use a structural dynamic discrete choice model in which the wage
regression is estimated °exibly. As far as we know, this has never been done.5
In this paper, we remove this oversight. We estimate a structural dynamic pro-
gramming model of schooling decisions with unobserved heterogeneity in school
ability and market ability, in which the wage regression is estimated using spline
techniques. The main objective of the present paper is to obtain structural es-
timates of the local (and average) returns to schooling in a model speci¯cation
which requires neither orthogonality between schooling attainments and market
ability nor linear separability between realized schooling and unobserved taste
for schooling. A second objective is to obtain structural estimates of the partial
correlation between realized average returns and both school and market abil-
ity, which may help understand the Discount Rate Bias. A third objective is
to investigate the unconditional relationship between market ability and realized
schooling attainments and evaluate the magnitude of the Ability Bias. The model
is implemented on a panel of white males taken from the National Longitudinal
Survey of Youth (NLSY) covering the years 1979 to 1990.
Our results reported below, cast doubt on the validity of the very high returns
reported in the literature. Our estimates of the return to schooling are much be-
low those reported in the literature and, contrary to conventional wisdom, the
log wage regression is found to be convex in schooling (Card, 2000). The null
hypothesis that the marginal (local) returns to schooling are constant is strongly
rejected in favor of a speci¯cation where the local returns are estimated using
8 spline segments. The local returns are very low until grade 11 (1% per year
or less), increase to 3.7% in grade 12 and exceed 10% only between grade 14
and grade 16. The average return (measured from grade 7) increases smoothly
from 0.4% (grade 7) to 4.6% (grade 16). For a representative individual (acquir-
ing between 12 and 13 years of schooling), the average realized return is around
1%. The convexity of the log wage regression function implies that, other things
equal, those endowed with higher school ability experience higher average returns
and those endowed with higher market ability experience lower average returns.
Therefore, those who obtain more schooling also experience higher average re-
turns. This indicates that estimates obtained from linear wage regressions may
su®er a severe Discount Rate Bias. At the same time, school ability and market
experience higher average returns to schooling").
5A relatively small number of authors have estimated structural models of schooling de-
cisions. Keane and Wolpin (1997) have used a structural dynamic programming model of
schooling and occupational decisions using a cohort of the NLSY. Eckstein and Wolpin (2000)
evaluate the e®ect of youth employment on academic performance of young Americans. Ar-
cidiacono (2000) has estimated a dynamic model of college choices. For a seminal paper on
empirical dynamic programming methods, see Rust (1986).
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ability are strongly correlated. As a consequence, the unconditional relationship
between schooling attainment and market ability is ambiguous. Our simulations
indicate that there is a positive correlation (0.28) between market ability and re-
alized schooling and orthogonality is strongly rejected. This is evidence in favor
of the existence of a positive Ability Bias6.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 is devoted to the presentation of
the empirical dynamic programming model. Section 3 contains a brief description
of the sample data. The main empirical results are found in Section 4. The
e®ects of heterogeneity on the estimates of the return to schooling are presented
in Section 5 and the reliability of linear wage regression models is discussed in
Section 6. The robustness of the results is analyzed in Section 7. Section 8
concludes.
2 An Empirical Dynamic Programming Model
In this section, we introduce the empirical dynamic programming model. Every
individual i is initially endowed with family human capital (Xi), innate market
and school ability (Àwi and À
»
i ) and a rate of time preference (½). Young individuals
decide sequentially whether it is optimal or not to enter the labor market or
continue accumulate human capital. Individuals maximize discounted expected
lifetime utility over a ¯nite (known) horizon T . Both the instantaneous utility
of being in school and the utility of work are logarithmic in income. The control
variable, dit; summarizes the stopping rule. When dit = 1; an individual invests
in an additional year of schooling at the beginning of period t. When dit = 0, an
individual leaves school at the beginning of period t (to enter the labor market).
Every decision is made at the beginning of the period and the amount of schooling
acquired by the beginning of date t is denoted Sit:
2.1 Household Characteristics and the Utility of Attend-
ing School
When in school, individuals receive income support, denoted »it: When an in-
dividual leaves school, he looses parental support. The instantaneous utility of
attending school, U school(:) is represented by the following equation
Uschool(:) = ln(»it) = X 0i± + Ã(Sit) + À
»
i + "
»
it (1)
with "»it » i:i:d N(0; ¾2» ) and represents a stochastic utility (income) shock. The
vector Xi contains the following variables: father's education, mother's educa-
tion, household income, number of siblings, family composition at age 14 and
6The magnitude of the Ability Bias is also central in the empirical literature on the time
series properties of wage inequality. For a recent example, see Taber (2000).
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regional controls7. The term À»i represents individual heterogeneity (ability) af-
fecting the utility of attending school. It is discussed in more details below. The
marginal e®ect of schooling level on parental transfers, Ã(:); is modeled using
spline functions.
2.2 Interruption of schooling
We assume that individuals interrupt schooling with exogenous probability ³(St)
and, as a consequence, the possibility to take a decision depends on a state
variable Iit:When Iit = 1; the decision problem is frozen for one period. If Iit = 0;
the decision can be made. The interruption state is meant to capture events such
as illness, injury, travel, temporary work, incarceration or academic failure. When
an interruption occurs, the stock of human capital remains constant over the
period. The NLSY does not contain data on parental transfers and, in particular,
does not allow a distinction in income received according to the interruption
status. As a consequence, we ignore the distinction between income support
while in school and income support when school is interrupted.8
2.3 The Utility of Work and the Return to Human Cap-
ital
Once the individual has entered the labor market, he receives monetary income
wit (an hourly wage rate) and a yearly employment rate, eit: The instantaneous
utility of labor market work is
Uwork(:) = ln(wit ¢ eit):
The log wage received at time t, is given by
ln(wit) = '1(Sit) + '2:Experit + '3:Exper
2
it + À
w
i + "
w
it (2)
where "wit » i:i:d N(0; ¾2w) and represents a stochastic wage shock. '1(:) is the
function capturing the e®ect of schooling on wages. The return to experience
(denoted Experit) is captured in '2 and '3 while Àwi is unobserved labor market
ability.
The employment rate, eit; is also allowed to depend on accumulated human
capital so that
ln e¤it = ln
1
eit
= ·0 + ·1 ¢ Sit + ·2 ¢ Experit + ·3 ¢ Exper2it + "eit (3)
7More detailed discussion is found in Belzil and Hansen (2001,a).
8When faced with a high failure probability, some individuals may spend a portion of the
year in school and a residual portion out of school. As a result, identifying a real interruption
from a true academic failure is tenuous. In the NLSY, we ¯nd that more than 85% of the
sample has never experienced school interruption.
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where ·0 is an intercept term, ·1 represents the employment security return to
schooling, both ·2 and ·3 represent the employment security return to experience.
The random shock "eit is normally distributed with mean 0 and variance ¾2e : All
random shocks ("»it; "wit; "eit) are assumed to be independent.
2.4 Bellman Equations
It is convenient to summarize the state variables in a vector (Sit; ´it) where ´it
is itself a vector containing the interruption status (Iit); the utility shock ("»it),
the wage shock ("wit); the employment shock ("eit); and accumulated experience
(Experit). We only model the decision to acquire schooling beyond 6 years (as
virtually every young male in the NLSY has completed at least six years of
schooling). We set T to 65 years and the maximum number of years of schooling
to 22. Dropping the individual subscript, the decision to remain in school, given
state variables St and ´t, denoted V st (St; ´t); can be expressed as
V st (St; ´t) = ln(»t) + ¯f³ ¢ EV It+1(St+1; ´t+1) (4)
+(1 ¡ ³) ¢ EMax[V st+1(St+1; ´t+1); V wt+1(St+1; ´t+1)]g
where V It+1(St+1; ´t+1) denotes the value of entering the interruption status. As we
cannot distinguish between income support while in school and income support
when school is interrupted, V It+1(St+1; ´t+1); can be expressed as follows.
V It+1(St+1; ´t+1) = log(»t+1) + ¯f³ ¢ EV It+2(St+2; ´t+2)
+(1 ¡ ³) ¢ EMax[V st+2(St+2; ´t+2); V wt+2(St+2; ´t+2)]g (5)
The value of stopping school (that is entering the labor market), V wt (St; ´t),
is given by
V wt (St) = ln(wit ¢ eit) + ¯E(Vt+1 j dt = 0) (6)
where E(Vt+1 j dt = 0) is simply
E(Vt+1 j dt = 0) =
TX
j=t+1
¯j¡(t+1)(¡ exp(¹j+12¾
2
e)+'1(Sj)+'2:Experj+'3:Exper
2
j )
(7)
and represents the expected utility of working from t + 1 until T . Using the
terminal value and the distributional assumptions about the stochastic shocks,
the probability of choosing a particular sequence of discrete choice can readily be
expressed in closed-form.
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2.5 Unobserved Ability in School and in the Market
In our model, heterogeneity has 2 dimensions: heterogeneity in school ability
(taste for schooling), À»i ; and heterogeneity in market ability, Àwi :We assume that
here are K types of individuals and that each type is endowed with a pair of
school and market ability (Àwk ; À
»
k) for k = 1; 2:::K and K = 6. The distribution
of unobserved ability is orthogonal to parents' background by construction and
should be understood as a measure of unobserved ability remaining after condi-
tioning on parents human capital. The probabilities of belonging to type k; pk;
are estimated using logistic transforms
pk =
exp(qk)P6
j=1 exp(qj)
and with the restriction that q6 equals 0.
2.6 Identi¯cation
Identi¯cation of the wage return to schooling. the employment return to schooling
and unobserved market ability is relatively straightforward given panel data on
labor market wages and employment rates. However, given the very small amount
of observations at both very low and very high levels of schooling, it is di±cult to
identify the local returns below grade 10 and above grade 17. Our model being
structured as a single choice dynamic model, data on both wages and schooling
attainments allow us to identify the key parameters the utility of attending school.
Finally, as is well known, identi¯cation of the subjective discount rate relies on
the standard assumption that preferences are time additive.
2.7 The Likelihood Function
Constructing the likelihood function (for a given type k) is relatively straightfor-
ward. It has three components; the probability of having spent at most ¿ years
in school (L1k), the probability of entering the labor market in year ¿ + 1; at
observed wage w¿+1 (denoted L2k) and the density of observed wages and em-
ployment rates from ¿ + 2 until 1990 (denoted L3k): L1k can easily be evaluated
using (4), (5) and (6), while L2k can be factored as the product of a normal
conditional probability times the marginal wage density. Finally L3k is just the
product of wage and employment rate densities. For a given type k, the likelihood
is therefore Lk = L1k ¢ L2k ¢ L3k and the log likelihood function to be maximized
is
logL = log
6X
k=1
pk ¢ Lk (8)
where each pk represents the population proportion of type k.
7
3 The Data
The sample used in the analysis is extracted from the 1979 youth cohort of the
The National Longitudinal Survey of Y outh (NLSY). The NLSY is a nation-
ally representative sample of 12,686 Americans who were 14-21 years old as of
January 1, 1979. After the initial survey, re-interviews have been conducted in
each subsequent year until 1996. In this paper, we restrict our sample to white
males who were age 20 or less as of January 1, 1979. We record information on
education, wages and on employment rates for each individual from the time the
individual is age 16 up to December 31, 1990.
The original sample contained 3,790 white males. We lost about 17% of the
sample due to missing information regarding family income and about 6% due
to missing information regarding parents' education. The age limit and missing
information regarding actual work experience further reduced the sample to 1,710.
Summary statistics may be found in Table 1.
Overall, the majority of young individuals acquire education without inter-
ruption. In our sample, only 306 individuals have experienced at least one in-
terruption. This represents only 18% of our sample and it is along the lines of
results reported in Keane and Wolpin (1997).9 Given the age of the individuals in
our sample, we assume that those who have already started to work full-time by
1990 (94% of our sample), will never return to school beyond 1990. More details
can be found in Belzil and Hansen (2001,a).
4 Empirical Results
This section is devoted to the presentation of the empirical results. The estimates
of the parameters capturing the e®ects of household characteristics on the utility
of attending school are found in Table 2 and discussed in details in Belzil and
Hansen (2001,a).10 In Section 4.1, we analyze the role of unobserved ability in
explaining schooling attainments. We discuss the returns to schooling in Section
4.2 and the internal rates of return in Section 4.3. In Section 4.4, we evaluate
the capacity of the model to ¯t the data on observed schooling attainments.
9Overall, interruptions tend to be quite short. Almost half of the individuals (45%) who
experienced an interruption, returned to school within one year while 73% returned within 3
years. More details may be found in Belzil and Hansen (2000,a).
10The estimates indicate that the utility of attending school increases with the level of hu-
man capital in the household. The incidence of schooling interruption is found to be 0.0749
and indicates that, on average, 7.5% of young individuals interrupt school in a given year.
The estimate of the subjective discount rate, 0.0299, appears quite reasonable and is close to
estimates reported in the ¯nancial economics literature (see Kocherlakota, 1996).
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4.1 The Role of Unobserved Ability in Explaining School-
ing Attainments
The importance of unobserved ability is illustrated in Table 3. The intercept
terms of the utility of attending school (À») range from -0.7318 (type 1) to -1.4904
(type 6). The intercept terms of the wage function (Àw) range from 2.1345 (type
1) to 1.0816 (type 6). There is clear evidence that those endowed with high
school ability are also endowed with high market ability. Both in ascending
order of school ability and market ability, the various types can be ranked as
follows, type 1, type 3, type 2, type 5, type 4 and type 6. The associated type
probabilities are as follows; 0.0541 (type 1), 0.2525 (type 2), 0.1566 (type 3),
0.3022 (type 4), 0.1249 (type 5) and 0.1098 (type 6). Type 1, type 3 and type 2
individuals appear particularly more able than other types. A deeper analysis of
the correlation between ability and realized schooling attainments is delayed to
Section 5.
4.2 The Return to Schooling
The wage and employment returns to schooling are found in Table 4A. Our ¯nd-
ings are consistent with what is normally expected; education reduces unemploy-
ment and raises wages.11 We note that the °exibility of our estimation method
discloses the weakness of model speci¯cations where the return to schooling is
captured in a single parameter. The level of signi¯cance of all spline estimates
(as indicated by the standard errors) indicate that, at all 8 knots joining the var-
ious segments, equality of the local returns across successive segments is strongly
rejected.12 This implies a clear rejection of the model with constant marginal
returns to schooling. Our estimates of the local returns, summarized in Table
4A, indicate that the marginal returns are generally increasing with the level of
schooling up to grade 14. The local returns to college training are substantially
higher than the returns to high-school education. Indeed, schooling has practi-
cally no value until grade 12. Until grade 10, the local return is below 1% per
year (0.4%). It increases to 1.2% in grade 11 and to 3.7% in grade 12. Beyond
high school graduation, the local return starts to increase substantially. The local
return increases to 6.0% in grade 13 and 12.7% in grade 14. After a drop at grade
15 (the local return is around 10.7%), the return to grade 16 raises to 12.2%. In
subsequent years (corresponding to graduate training), the local returns are es-
11The estimate of the e®ects of education (-0.1331) and actual experience (-0.0156) on the
log inverse employment rate indicate that there is a clear negative (positive) signi¯cant rela-
tionship between individual unemployment (employment) rates and human capital. The e®ect
of experience squared on the log employment rate is found to be very small (and insigni¯cant).
12In practice, we kept a spline at each grade level where the equality between successive
returns is rejected. In the end, we found that as many as 8 splines were necessary to summarize
the log wage regression function accurately.
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timated to be 8.8% per year. Until college graduation, and except for the lower
local return in grade 15, the log wage regression equation is convex in schooling.13
This is contrary to what is often postulated (see Card, 2000).14
The variations in the local returns to schooling illustrate the distortions in-
troduced in a model built on the assumption that the local returns to schooling
are constant. As the local and average returns are identical in a linear model,
it is also important to compare our estimates of the average return with those
obtained in the literature. The average returns are also found in Table 4A. Al-
though the average returns are naturally computed from grade 7, they may also
be measured from the beginning of the period over which an individual can legally
leave school (around grade 10). The low returns at lower level of schooling, along
with the sharp increase at grades 12, 13, 14 and 16, imply a relatively smooth
increase in the average return to schooling. At college graduation, the average
return (measured from grade 7) is around 4.6% per year. In the population, the
realized average returns are much smaller as a typical individual would obtain
between 12 and 13 years of schooling. In grade 12, the average return is less
than 1% per year (0.71%) while, in grade 13, the average return is 1.47%. When
measured from grade 7, the average return at high-school graduation is 1.8% per
year and it is 6.7% at college graduation.
Finally, the estimates for actual experience (0.0880) and its square (-0.0030)
show that our panel is su±ciently long to capture concavity in age-earnings pro-
¯les. The high return to experience is not really surprising for young workers.
To summarize, our estimates of the return to schooling are much below those
reported in the reduced-form literature, and interestingly, they can also be rec-
onciled with the relatively weak correlation between education and growth found
in the empirical literature.15
13While it might be tempted to impute the convexity to the assumption that the returns are
homogeneous in the population, the results reported in a companion paper (Belzil and Hansen,
2000b) indicate that it is not the case.
14We have also estimated the model under alternative speci¯cations (a ¯nite mixture version
without household human capital variables as well as a version where type probabilities are
also function of observable characteristics) but found practically identical results. Another
estimation strategy would be to include AFQT scores in the intercept terms of both the utility
of attending school and the log wage regression function. However, this approach could lead to
an understatement of the e®ects of schooling on wages, if AFQT scores are themselves explained
by schooling.
15Manski and Pepper (2000) also conclude that the true returns are most probably below
those reported in the literature. Rosenzweig and Wolpin (2000) argue that estimates of the
return to schooling which ignore post-schooling human capital investments are likely to be
unreliable. For a review of the empirical growth literature, see Topel, 2000.
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4.3 Internal Rate of Return to Four Year College
Using a measure of tuition for 4 year colleges, it is also possible to evaluate the
internal rate of return; that is the rate of return that equates the discounted sum
of direct costs and foregone wages with the increased wages due to completing
college versus high school. It will provide key insights about the mechanics of the
model and will enable us to compare the higher local returns to post high-school
education with rates of return on other types of investments. Over the period
covered by the data, the average tuition in the US was around $3,400 per year
(in 1990$).16 While other direct costs are unknown, the tuition cost is clearly a
lower bound for the total cost of attending college. We have computed 2 di®erent
internal rates of return; one for a yearly cost of $5,000 per year and one for a
cost of $10,000. This di®erence can account for factors such as college quality.
In both cases, we have computed a type speci¯c internal rate of return as well
as a population average. These are found in Table 4B. The internal rates range
from 5% to 8% in the $5,000 scenario and from 3% to 6% in the $10,000 scenario.
Not surprisingly, we ¯nd that internal rates are higher for those with high ability
(type 1, type 3 and type 2) than for those with low ability (type 4, type 5 and
type 6). Overall, these internal rates are comparable to rates of return on risky
investments (Kocherlakota, 1996).
4.4 Goodness of Fit
One of the most distinctive features of observed schooling attainments, is the very
uneven distribution across various grade levels. Actual frequencies are presented
in Table 5. They indicate that around 60% of young males have completed either
12 or 16 years of schooling. The predicted frequencies are also shown in Table 5.
The model is able to predict large frequencies at grade 12 and grade 16. When
compared to the actual frequencies, the predictions appear quite accurate.17
5 Evaluating the E®ects of Heterogeneity on the
Returns to Schooling
As a next step, we computed the partial correlations between both forms of abil-
ity and realized schooling attainments generated by the parameters of the model.
These partial correlations represent an alternative way to illustrate the con°ict
between school and market ability and are useful in order to understand the Dis-
count Rate Bias. In view of the large number of reduced-form estimates based
on the assumption that the returns to schooling may be estimated using OLS, it
16See Light and Strayer (2000).
17The capacity of the model to ¯t data on lifetime employment rates is discussed in Belzil
and Hansen (2000,a).
11
is also interesting to investigate the unconditional relationship between market
ability and the average returns as well as the correlation between market ability
and realized schooling attainments. While there is no obvious way of measuring
the bias in the local returns caused by assuming orthogonality between market
ability and the regression function in our model, the correlation between unob-
served market ability and realized schooling would still provide a good indication
of the importance of the Ability Bias.
The correlations are summarized in Table 6. The correlation between ability
in school and ability in the market, Corr(Àwi ; À
»
i ); is found to be high (0.95).
Holding market ability constant, we ¯nd a strong positive correlation between
average returns and school ability, Corr(À»i ;
'(Si)
Si
jÀwi =¹Àw) = 0:80. This positive
correlation implies that, holding market ability and family background variables
constant, those endowed with higher school ability will also experience higher
average returns. This is an illustration of the discount rate bias. As expected,
and contrary to school ability, the partial correlation between market ability and
schooling is negative, Corr( Àwi ;
'(Si)
Si
jÀ»i=¹À») = ¡0:84.
Our estimates of the correlation between unobserved market ability and av-
erage returns, Corr( Àwi ;
'(Si)
Si
) , and the correlation between unobserved market
ability and realized schooling, Corr(Àwi ; Si); are both positive. They are respec-
tively equal to 0:23 and 0:28 and are signi¯cant at the 1% level. Orthogonality
between market ability and realized schooling is therefore strongly rejected. This
provides evidence in favor of the existence of a strong positive ability bias. Esti-
mation methods based on the maintained assumption that realized schooling and
market ability are orthogonal are therefore questionable. They will clearly lead
to an over-estimation of the average return to schooling.
6 Can a Single Parameter Summarize the Av-
erage Return Accurately?
Estimating the return to schooling and experience in a reduced-form framework
is particularly di±cult since, in general, schooling and experience cannot be sep-
arated linearly from unobserved ability components. To see this, re-write the
wage regression function as
ln(wit) = '1(Sit( À
»
i ; À
w
i )) +'2:Experit( À
»
i ; À
w
i ) +'3:Exper
2
it(À
»
i ; À
w
i ) + À
w
i + "
w
it
(9)
In the literature, it is usually assumed that '1(:) is linear in schooling and that Sit
and À»i are linearly separable. For those who seek to estimate the true returns in
an instrumental variable framework, these assumptions are particularly crucial.
If the linear log wage regression is not supported by the data and the form of the
wage regression function is unknown, the estimation method is more complicated
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(see Newey, Powell and Vella, 1999, for a static labor supply example and Blundell
and Powell, 2000, for a survey). Furthermore, if unobserved ability and schooling
cannot be separated linearly, this is even more di±cult (see Heckman and Vitlacyl,
2000). However, while a linear regression framework is incapable of capturing
changes in the local returns to schooling, it might be argued that it can still
estimate the average return accurately.
In Table 7, we compare the maximum likelihood estimates of the average
return to schooling obtained from the structural dynamic programming model to
those obtained using OLS estimates. We considered the standard OLS estimate
as well as the OLS estimate with splines (with the same spline segments as in
the structural dynamic programming model). We report the estimates of the
average return to schooling at high school graduation (grade 12) and at college
graduation (grade 16). For both of these, we report values measured from grade
7 and values measured from grade 10.
The incapacity of OLS estimates to capture the average return over the en-
tire range is well documented. In the 1990 cross-section of the NLSY, the OLS
estimate of the return to schooling is 0.0995.18 When the OLS regression is com-
posed of 8 splines, the average returns measured from grade 7 are equal to 9.71%
in grade 12 and 11.29% in grade 16. When measured from grade 10, the aver-
age returns are 8.66% (grade 12) and 9.42% (grade 16). As a comparison, our
structural estimates of the average return at high school graduation (0.71%) and
at college graduation (4.6%), measured from grade 7, are much below the OLS
estimates. This is also true of those average returns measured from grade 10
(1.77% in grade 12 and 6.69% in grade 16). Evidently, estimation methods that
do not allow for a °exible estimation of the local returns to schooling will lead to
unreliable estimates of both the local and the average returns to schooling.
7 Robustness and Alternative Speci¯cations
At this stage, it is natural to investigate the robustness of the results. In our
model, the e®ects of parents' human capital are asymmetric: household back-
ground variables a®ect the utility of attending school but do not a®ect labor
market skills per se. This assumption might be questioned. To evaluate the sen-
sitivity of the results, we estimated other model speci¯cations which allow for
a more symmetric treatment of family background variables. In particular, and
consistent with Keane and Wolpin (1997) and Eckstein and Wolpin (1999), we
estimated a ¯nite mixture version of the model (with 6 unknown types) which
ignores data on household characteristics. In this model speci¯cation, asymme-
try is obviously not an issue. The °exibility of the speci¯cation allows for any
arbitrary correlation between the utility of attending school and market ability.
The estimates of the wage regression function are found in Table 8.
18When OLS is applied to the entire panel, the estimate is 0.0998.
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There is overwhelming evidence that the basic results (the low returns and
the convexity of the wage regression) are in no way a®ected by the treatment
of family background variables, as indicated by the local and average returns.
Generally speaking, the returns obtained in a mixture model are only slightly
higher than those obtained with parents' background, especially until grade 14.
As before, the returns to schooling are low until high school graduation (4.8% in
grade 12) and increase signi¯cantly in grade 14 (to reach 14.5%). The local return
in grade 16 (11%) is however lower than in the model using parents' background
variables. The high degree of convexity of the wage regression is therefore very
robust. Other parameter estimates as well as a more in-depth discussion may be
found in Belzil and Hansen (2000,a).
We have also estimated another version of the model where father's education,
mother's education, household income and number of siblings a®ect both the
utility of attending school and the wage regression equation (the rest of the
variables still a®ect the utility of attending school) and where the employment
equation is a®ected by unobserved heterogeneity (6 individual speci¯c intercept
terms). The returns to schooling have been found to be generally lower (2% in
grade 12) but the wage regression function still displays a high degree of convexity
(the local return at college graduation is 11.7%). Not surprisingly, the e®ect of
family background on the utility of attending school has been found to be much
stronger than on wages. This issue, as well as other matters that are not directly
related to the estimation of the returns to schooling, are discussed in details in a
companion paper (Belzil and Hansen, 2001d).
8 Conclusion
We have estimated a structural dynamic programming model of schooling deci-
sions in which individuals are heterogeneous with respect to ability in school and
ability in the labor market. The rich speci¯cation of the model has allowed us
to estimate the true return to schooling without assuming orthogonality between
labor market ability and schooling attainments and to obtain structural esti-
mates of various correlations between school ability, market ability and realized
schooling attainments.
We ¯nd that the local returns are very small at low levels of schooling and
increase signi¯cantly beyond high school graduation. Indeed, schooling has prac-
tically no value until high school graduation. We also ¯nd that a linear wage
regression is severely mis-speci¯ed (the estimates su®er a severe discount rate
bias) and that, in general, any regression model (whether linear or non-linear),
estimated under the assumption that realized schooling and market ability are
orthogonal, su®ers a positive ability bias. The results are very robust. A ¯nite
mixture model (with 6 types) ignoring data on parents' background as well as
a model speci¯cation in which parents' human capital a®ect both labor market
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ability and the utility of attending school gave very similar results. The basic
¯ndings (the low returns to schooling and the very high degree of convexity of the
wage regression) are in no way related to the treatment of household background
variables.
Overall, our results cast serious doubts on the validity of most results reported
in the empirical labor economics literature. First, OLS estimates of the return to
schooling that depend on the assumption that endogenous schooling attainment
is orthogonal to unobserved determinants of wages are therefore most likely unre-
liable. They can seriously over-estimate the average return to schooling. Second,
the convexity of the log wage regression function, along with the non-separability
(linear) of realized schooling and abilities, imply that standard IV techniques are
also ill-equipped to tackle the estimation of the return to schooling. As it stands
now, the development of non-parametric (or semi-parametric) econometric mod-
els with endogenous regressors is a major topic of ongoing research (see Blundell
and Powell, 2000). These techniques are certainly not used widely by labor econo-
mists and, as a consequence, the validity of the results already reported in the
literature can be questioned seriously.
As is done in most of the literature, we have assumed that di®erences in
market ability can be captured in the intercept of the log wage regression function
and that individual di®erences in realized returns to schooling are explained by
non-linearities in the wage regression function. This is an ad-hoc assumption.
More able individuals may also have a higher return to schooling as well as a
higher return to experience. However, confronting a non-linear (non-parametric)
wage regression to a random coe±cient wage regression is di±cult. In panel
data, individual wages are usually observed for a ¯xed level of schooling. Cross-
sectional heterogeneity and non-linearities in the returns to schooling are di±cult
to identify separately. As a consequence, the empirical investigation of more
general models in which market ability heterogeneity a®ects both the returns to
schooling and the return to experience, is a promising avenue for future research.19
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Table 1 - Descriptive Statistics
Mean St dev. # of individuals
Family Income/1000 36,904 27.61 1710
father's educ 11.69 3.47 1710
mother's educ 11.67 2.46 1710
# of siblings 3.18 2.13 1710
prop. raised in urban areas 0.73 - 1710
prop. raised in south 0.27 - 1710
prop in nuclear family 0.79 - 1710
Schooling completed (1990) 12.81 2.58 1710
# of interruptions 0.06 0.51 1710
duration of interruptions (year) 0.43 1.39 1710
wage 1979 (hour) 7.36 2.43 217
wage 1980 (hour) 7.17 2.74 422
wage 1981 (hour) 7.18 2.75 598
wage 1982 (hour) 7.43 3.17 819
wage 1983 (hour) 7.35 3.21 947
wage 1984 (hour) 7.66 3.60 1071
wage 1985 (hour) 8.08 3.54 1060
wage 1986 (hour) 8.75 3.87 1097
wage 1987 (hour) 9.64 4.44 1147
wage 1988 (hour) 10.32 4.89 1215
wage 1989 (hour) 10.47 4.97 1232
wage 1990 (hour) 10.99 5.23 1230
Experience 1990 (years) 8.05 11.55 1230
Note: Family income and hourly wages are reported in 1990 dollars. Family
income is measured as of May 1978. The increasing number of wage observations
is explained by the increase in participation rates.
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Table 2
The Utility of Attending School, Subjective Discount Rates and
Interruption Probabilities
Parameter Std error
Utility in School
Father's Educ 0.0094 0.0011
Mother's Educ 0.0070 0.0012
Family Income/1000 0.0007 0.0001
Nuclear Family 0.0204 0.0056
Siblings -0.0071 0.0012
Rural -0.0058 0.0048
South -0.0176 0.0050
Stand.Dev.(¾») 0.2251 0.0160
Educ. Splines
±7¡10 -0.0743 0.0133
±11 -0.0494 0.0120
±12 -1.1676 0.0190
±13 0.2486 0.0293
±14 1.4286 0.0345
±15 -0.1151 0.0208
±16 0.3001 0.0209
±17¡more -0.7227 0.0168
Interruption Prob. 0.0749 0.0031
Discount Rate 0.0299 0.0009
mean log Likelihood -13.9957
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Table 3
The Distribution of Unobserved Ability
Param. St Error Rankings
Type 1 À»1 School ab. -0.7318 (0.0154) 1
Àw1 Market ab. 2.1395 (0.0199) 1
q1 intercept -0.7082 (0.0021) -
Type 2 À»2 School ab. -1.1021 (0.0171) 3
Àw2 Market ab. 1.6787 (0.0133) 3
q2 intercept 0.8329 (0.0449) -
Type 3 À»3 School ab. -0.8785 (0.0146) 2
Àw3 Market ab. 1.9136 (0.0173) 2
q3 intercept 0.3551 (0.0411) -
Type 4 À»4 School ab. -1.3206 (0.0202) 5
Àw4 Market ab. 1.3774 (0.0115) 5
q4 intercept 1.0127 (0.0038) -
Type 5 À»5 School ab. -1.1815 (0.0193) 4
Àw5 Market ab. 1.5488 (0.0082) 4
q5 intercept 0.1291 (0.0230) -
Type 6 À»6 School ab. -1.4904 (0.0215) 6
Àw6 Market ab. 1.0816 (0.0162) 6
q6 intercept 0.0 (normalized) -
Note: The type probabilities are estimated using a logistic transform. The
resulting probabilities are 0.0541 (type 1), 0.2525 (type 2), 0.1566 (type 3), 0.3022
(type 4), 0.1249 (type 5) and 0.1098 (type 6).
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Table 4A
The Return to Schooling
Parameter
( st. error)
Employment
Intercept -2.8173 (0.0115)
Schooling -0.1309 (0.0029)
Experience -0.0158 (0.0024)
experience2 0.0001 (0.0000)
¾2e 1.4858 (0.0102)
Wages
¾2w 0.2881 (0.0023)
Experience 0.0884 (0.0025)
experience2 -0.0029 (0.0002)
Wage Returns to Schooling
Splines Local Average Average
Grade (from grade 7) (from grade 10)
grade7-10 0.0040 (0.0012) 0.0040 0.0040 0.0040
grade11 0.0080 (0.0019) 0.0120 0.0056 0.0080
grade12 0.0252 (0.0025) 0.0372 0.0071 0.0177
grade13 0.0227 (0.0019) 0.0599 0.0147 0.0280
grade14 0.0670 (0.0023) 0.1269 0.0287 0.0478
grade15 -0.0195 (0.0035) 0.1074 0.0374 0.0577
grade16 0.0148 (0.0033) 0.1222 0.0459 0.0669
grade17+ -0.0345 (0.0027) 0.0877 0.0506 0.0696
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Table 4B
Internal Rate of Returns for a 4 Year College
Types yearly cost ($1990) yearly cost ($1990)
$ 5000 $10,000
type 1 8.4% 6.2%
type 2 7.0% 4.8%
type 3 7.7% 5.5%
type 4 6.0% 3.9%
type 5 6.6% 4.5%
type 6 5.1% 3.2%
Average 6.8% 4.7%
Table 5
Model Fit: Actual vs Predicted Schooling Attainments
Grade Level Predicted (%) Actual %
Grade 6-8 6.0% 3.0%
Grade 9 7.7% 4.7 %
Grade10 7.3% 6.0 %
Grade11 8.5% 7.5 %
Grade12 41.0% 39.6 %
Grade13 6.9% 7.0 %
Grade14 5.8% 7.7 %
Grade15 1.7% 2.9 %
Grade16 10.0% 12.9 %
Grade17 + 5.7% 7.9 %
22
Table 6.
Correlations between Ability and the Average Returns to Schooling
Correlations (P values)
Partial Correlations
School ab. and av. returns Corr( À»i ;
'(Si)
Si
j Àwi = ¹Àw) 0.80 (0.001)
Market ab. and av. Returns Corr( Àwi ;
'(Si)
Si
j À»i = ¹À») -0.84 (0.001)
Correlations
School ab. and market ab. Corr( Àwi ; À
»
i ) 0.95 (0.001)
Market ab. and av. returns Corr( Àwi ;
'(Si)
Si
) 0.23 (0.001)
Market ab. and Schooling Corr( Àwi ; Si) 0.28 (0.001)
Table 7
Estimates of the Average Return to Schooling
Average Returns Average Returns
Computed from Grade 7 Computed from Grade 10
Estimation Method (grade 12) (grade 16) (grade 12) (grade 16)
Dynamic Prog. (ML) 0.0071 0.0459 0.0177 0.0699
OLS (linear) 0.0995 0.0995 0.0995 0.0995
OLS (Splines) 0.0970 0.1129 0.0866 0.0942
Note: The OLS estimates, reported in Table 7, are computed on the cross-section
of 1990. Both OLS regressions contains experience and experience2. The OLS
regression with splines contains 8 segments (grade 7 to 10, grade 11, grade 12,
grade 13, grade 14, grade 15, grade 16 and grade 17 and more).
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Table 8
Estimates of the Wage Regression Function under an Alternative
Model Speci¯cation
Non-Parametric Mixture Model
(no Background Variable)
Splines Local . Av. ret. Av. ret
param (st error) returns (from gr. 7) (from gr.10)
Grade
grade7-10 0.0041 (0.0009) 0.0041 0.0041 0.0041
grade11 0.0093 (0.0034) 0.0134 0.0060 0.0088
grade12 0.0346 (0.0027) 0.0480 0.0130 0.0218
grade13 0.0135 (0.0028) 0.0615 0.0200 0.0318
grade14 0.0839 (0.0034) 0.1454 0.0359 0.0545
grade15 -0.0365 (0.0034) 0.1089 0.0437 0.0636
grade16 0.0034 (0.0040) 0.1123 0.0506 0.0705
grade17+ -0.0367 (0.0040) 0.0746 0.0528 0.0710
Exper. 0.0973 (0.0030) - -
Exper2 -0.0039 (0.0003) - -
log lik. -14.1648 - - -
Note: The mixture model is estimated under the assumption that the population
is composed of 6 unknown types.
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